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A tale of two cases: urging caution in
the prosecution of HIV non-disclosure
Two provincial Courts of Appeal have recently released unanimous decisions that clarify
the law regarding the obligation imposed upon people living with HIV to disclose their
HIV status prior to sexual relations. The decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal
in R v. Mabior1 and of the Quebec Court of Appeal in R c. D.C.2 must be seen against
a background of increasing criminal prosecutions in Canada of people with HIV who
allegedly do not disclose their HIV status to sexual partners. Since the first HIV nondisclosure prosecution in 1989, there have been over 120 prosecutions. A high proportion of accused has either pleaded guilty to, or been convicted at trial, of serious
criminal offences, often resulting in harsh sentences and sex offender registration.3 In
the majority of convictions, there was no transmission of HIV to the complainant.4

Despite the significant number of
prosecutions, it is arguable that people
living with HIV who know of their
infection, of whom there were an
estimated 48 100 in Canada in 2008,5
cannot ascertain their criminal law
disclosure obligation. The test set out
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R
v. Cuerrier,6 requiring significant risk
of serious bodily harm, has not provided adequate guidance to people living with HIV, police, Crown counsel
or lower courts. The Supreme Court
will soon have an opportunity to
revisit Cuerrier. It has granted leave
to appeal in Mabior and D.C.,7 which
will be heard together. In both cases,
the Crown is arguing for a doctrine
of informed consent in sexual assault
such that non-disclosure accompanied by any risk of HIV transmission, regardless of condom use or
the amount of HIV in the infected
person’s blood (known as viral load),
would attract criminal liability.8 This
comment begins with a review of each
case, focusing on the analysis of the
appellate courts, and then discusses
three issues that the Supreme Court of
Canada must confront when it hears
the appeals.
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The Mabior case

The accused was diagnosed as HIVpositive in January 2004, and placed
on antiretroviral therapy in April
2004. Between February 2004 and
January 2006, the accused had sexual
relations with nine female complainants, several of them teenagers,
sometimes with condoms and sometimes without, and often the relations
involved use of alcohol and illicit
drugs supplied by the accused. There
was evidence that he had not been
using condoms properly during this
time, because he was infected twice
with gonorrhoea and was listed as a
contact for chlamydia. To date, none
of the complainants has tested positive for HIV.
At trial, the accused was convicted
of six counts of aggravated sexual
assault and one count each of invitation to sexual touching and sexual
interference, and was sentenced to a
total of 14 years’ incarceration.9 The
trial judge found that five of these
six complainants would not have had
sex with Mabior if they had known
of his HIV-positive status. The sixth,
who was 14 years of age, learned of
his status during the course of their

sexual relationship. The trial judge
stated several times in her reasons
that condom usage only resulted in
an 80 percent reduction of the risk of
transmission of HIV, but she did not
clearly apply this level of risk reduction to the already low rates of sexual
transmission. In essence, she found
that any risk of transmission was
sufficient to meet the Cuerrier test —
only when use of a condom and an
undetectable viral load are both present would the risk be reduced sufficiently to negate the significant risk
of serious bodily harm.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, in
a cautious and well-reasoned judgment, attempted to put some limits on
the criminalization of non-disclosure.
The Court sought to achieve a balance between competing interests:
In this context, no one, including the
intervener, the Canadian HIV/AIDS
Legal Network, disagrees with charging individuals who intentionally or
recklessly infect their partners with a
serious disease. The criminal law has
a role to play in protecting the public
from irresponsible individuals. Nor is
there any disagreement that, from an
ethical and public health perspective,
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disclosure is necessary. However,
between those two poles, policy considerations should impact on the law
so as to produce a more nuanced view
of when failure to disclose warrants
criminal sanctions. There are other
mechanisms for the state to intervene, short of criminalizing the act.
Criminal sanctions should be reserved
for those deliberate, irresponsible
or reckless individuals who do not
respond to public health directives and
who are truly blameworthy.10

The Court held that the trial judge
made two errors. First, even though
the test requires that there be a significant risk, the trial judge required
that, to avoid conviction, there must
be virtually no risk of harm, requiring both the use of condoms and an
undetectable viral load. Instead, the
Court held that, if either of these factors was present, HIV non-disclosure
was not subject to criminal liability
because the risk would be reduced
below what is considered significant.
Second, the Court held that the trial judge had erred in her focus on the
finding that condoms reduce the risk
of sexual transmission by 80 percent.
The Court clarified that 80 percent
relates to an 80 percent reduction of
an already low rate of sexual transmission. The risk of transmission the
trial judge should have considered
was 20 percent of “an already small
baseline figure.”11 The Court found
that “consistent and careful use of
condoms”12 or “reasonably proper
condom use”13 reduces the risk below
significance. The Court explicitly
rejected the Crown’s argument that,
because the potential harm involved
was so serious, virtually any possibility of that harm occurring was
significant.
The Court elaborated on the careful use of condoms by listing 10 fac-
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tors provided by an expert witness
that would represent “an ideal situation.”14 In addition, the Court made
clear that, when a condom breaks, the
accused must immediately disclose
his or her HIV status to a non-HIVpositive partner so that the partner
may seek prophylactic measures.
Non-disclosure in this context would
be equated with unprotected sex.15
The Court noted the significance
of the scientific developments postCuerrier, including the successful
use of antiretroviral therapy, which
can dramatically reduce viral load
and subsequent risk of transmission.
The Court held that the application
of Cuerrier must “evolve to account
appropriately for the development
of the science of HIV treatment.”16

People living with HIV
who know of their
infection cannot ascertain
with certainty their
criminal law disclosure
obligation.

However, the Court was not willing
to make definitive statements on viral
load and instead held that each case
will depend on the evidence presented, while also urging the Supreme
Court of Canada to provide more
guidance.17 On the facts, the Court
of Appeal found that the standard
of “significant risk of serious bodily
harm” was met with respect to only

non - disclosure

two of the accused’s six aggravated
sexual assault convictions.

The D.C. case
In the summer of 2000, D.C. met a
man at a soccer pitch, where each
had a son playing soccer. Thus
began a four-year relationship.
The trial judge found one incident
of unprotected sexual intercourse
prior to HIV disclosure, which took
place early in the relationship. The
relationship came to a tumultuous
end in November 2004 when D.C.
called police alleging that her partner
had physically assaulted her and her
son. Her partner was charged with,
and convicted at trial of, assault.
In February 2005, he contacted
the police and complained of the
one earlier incident of unprotected
intercourse prior to HIV disclosure.
D.C. was charged with one count
each of aggravated assault and sexual
assault.
At trial, expert medical testimony
established that the risk of HIV
transmission during unprotected
sexual intercourse between an HIVinfected female and a male is 1 in
1000, irrespective of HIV viral load.18
Where the female’s HIV viral load is
“undetectable” (below 50 copies of
HIV per millilitre of blood), the risk
of transmission is 1 in 10 000, which
risk decreases to 1 in 50 000 where
a condom is used. Citing Cuerrier
and Williams,19 the trial judge found
D.C. guilty of aggravated assault
because her failure to disclose her
HIV status prior to unprotected
sexual intercourse exposed her
partner to a significant risk of serious
bodily harm. The trial judge also
found D.C. guilty of sexual assault,
since her partner’s consent to sex
had been vitiated by the HIV
non-disclosure.
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D.C. appealed her convictions to
the Quebec Court of Appeal. She
argued that the trial judgment represented an unwarranted and overly
expansive interpretation of the criminal obligations placed upon HIVpositive people, and erred in rejecting
the uncontradicted expert evidence
of the extremely minimal risk of HIV
transmission in the circumstances of
the case, thereby ignoring the significant risk standard established in
Cuerrier. The Crown argued that the
failure by an HIV-positive person to
disclose his or her HIV status prior
to unprotected sexual intercourse carried sufficient risk to vitiate his or her
partner’s consent to intercourse.
A unanimous Court of Appeal
addressed the “heart of the appeal”:20
the relationship between the disclosure obligation, the significance of
the risk of bodily harm and the medical evidence. The Court reviewed the
essential elements of fraud in sexual
relations — dishonesty and the risk
of deprivation — established by the
Supreme Court in Cuerrier. Its analysis highlighted those parts of Justice
Cory’s judgment that tie the HIV
disclosure obligation to the risk posed
to the sexual partner’s health: the disclosure obligation increases with the
risk associated with the sexual act.21
The Court found that the trial judge
had erred in the application of the test
to the evidence. There was uncontradicted evidence that the accused
had an undetectable viral load. The
Court reviewed the expert testimony
and found that, as a result of effective medications, D.C.’s HIV viral
load became undetectable at the end
of June 2000 and stayed undetectable until spring of 2001. The Court
found that, in the circumstances of
the case, the risk of transmission was
so small as not to constitute a “sig-
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nificant risk of serious bodily harm,”
such that D.C.’s failure to disclose
her HIV status to the complainant did
not vitiate his consent to unprotected
sexual intercourse as required under
Cuerrier.22 In the Court’s view, the
terms used by the medical experts
(“very weak,” “very minimal” and
“very, very low”) were incompatible
with the existence of any significant
risk whatsoever.23 Thus, the trial
judge had erred in finding that the
Crown had proven the offences of
sexual assault and aggravated assault.
The Court quotes favourably from
Justice Steel’s reasons in Mabior,
including the invitation to the
Supreme Court to revisit and clarify
the inherent uncertainty in the significant risk test.24 In conclusion, the
Court suggests that the question of
the use of the criminal law to address
the transmission of serious communicable infections might be one
most appropriately left to Parliament,
given the issue’s numerous social,
ethical and moral ramifications.25

Analysis and comment
These cases could not be more different on their facts and demonstrate the
wide range of complex and diverse
circumstances that lead to HIV nondisclosure prosecutions. What these
cases share, however, is that the trial
judges held that any risk of transmission of HIV was sufficient to satisfy
the “significant risk of serious bodily
harm” test from Cuerrier. Both
appeal courts disagreed, holding that
the requirement from Cuerrier that
the risk be significant must be given
some meaning and that not all risks
will vitiate consent to sex. These
cases provide the opportunity for the
Supreme Court of Canada to examine
how our increased knowledge of HIV
transmission risk, and our ability to

HIV
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greatly reduce that already low risk
through condoms and antiretroviral
medication, should affect a legal test
developed at a time when HIV almost
always led to AIDS and death. We
discuss three issues that merit consideration by the Supreme Court.

The requirement from
Cuerrier that the risk be
significant must be given
some meaning — not all
risks will vitiate consent
to sex.

The significant risk test: an
evidence-informed approach
The Supreme Court will soon have
the opportunity to clarify the significant risk of serious bodily harm
test. If the Supreme Court follows
its Cuerrier analysis, the Court of
Appeal’s reasoning in Mabior is an
excellent, evidence-informed starting point. The latter Court provides
overall guidance as to the appropriate
function of the criminal law in the
context of HIV non-disclosure, fundamentally distinguishing between
what the majority of people would
consider moral or ethical sexual
conduct, and conduct that should
be subject to criminal sanction:
“[e]veryone would want to be told
that a potential partner was HIVpositive. Most people would agree
that there was a moral and ethical
obligation to disclose that information.”26 Yet the Court explicitly
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recognized that criminal sanctions
should only be imposed where the
risk of bodily harm resulting from the
non-disclosure is significant.27
The Court articulated the following principles for determining whether the sexual act put the complainant
at a “significant risk of serious bodily
harm”: (i) at present, being infected
with HIV subjects an individual to
serious bodily harm;28 (ii) the Crown
will bear the burden of proving that
there was a significant risk of HIV
transmission given the HIV viral
load of the accused at the relevant
time(s);29 (iii) the determination of
risk should be consistent with medical science related to HIV/AIDS,
which will develop over time;30 (iv)
the risk of sexual transmission is
cumulative, increasing with each riskpresenting act; (v) reasonably proper
condom use, as opposed to perfect
condom use, reduces the risk of sexual transmission to below the level
of significance;31 and (vi) where a
condom breaks, immediate disclosure
by the HIV-positive partner could
suffice to reduce the risk of harm.32
Non-disclosure after a condom breaks
is only criminalized where there is a
detectable viral load.
Significantly, the Court recognizes
the significant legal relevance of condoms in determining HIV transmission risk and the criminal law duty
of disclosure. The Court accepts that
even reasonably proper condom use,
as opposed to perfect condom use,
for sexual intercourse reduces the
risk of HIV transmission to below the
level of significance.33 This position
is consistent with the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Cuerrier
and encourages mutually responsible
sexual behaviour that will ultimately
reduce the risk of HIV transmission
more than disclosure.
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By contrast, the Court’s equivocal approach to the impact of HIV
viral load on the risk of transmission
represents a missed opportunity to
clarify the law further:
It is true that the test for a viral load
is done for “a moment in time.” …
Common infections, STDs and treatment issues can lead to fluctuations
in a person’s viral load. HIV-positive
people with apparently undetectable
viral loads can experience occasional
spikes in viral load or may develop
viral resistance. Consequently, no
comprehensive statement can be made
about the impact of low viral loads
on the question of risk. Each case
will depend on the facts regarding the
particular accused, and each case will
depend on the state of the medical
evidence at the time and the manner in
which it is presented in that particular
case.34 [Emphasis added.]

This approach is unfortunate given
the large body of recent scientific
literature suggesting that effective
antiretroviral therapy offers more significant protection against HIV transmission during sex than does condom
use.35 It also stands in contrast to the
Court’s findings on the facts of the
case. It posed the following question in relation to each complainant
where it found that a condom was not
properly used: “[w]as the accused’s
viral load undetectable at the time of
sexual intercourse?” If so, there was
no significant risk of HIV transmission, no duty to disclose on the part
of Mabior and no criminalization of
non-disclosure.
One issue that must be addressed
in the context of viral load is burden
of proof. We suggest that the burden
be on the Crown to prove all elements
of the assault offence beyond a reasonable doubt, which includes leading evidence to establish that, in the

non - disclosure

circumstances of the case, the sexual
act presented a significant risk of serious bodily harm to the complainant.
This approach is preferable to the
one set out by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in Wright,36 whereby
the Crown can establish a significant
risk based on average risk as set
out in the literature. The approach
from Wright is based on the heavily
stigmatizing presumption that sexual
intercourse with a person living with
HIV per se presents a significant risk
of HIV transmission, which reflects
an outdated, inaccurate view of HIV.
Moreover, the courts of appeal in
Mabior and D.C. soundly reject this
presumption in favour of a casespecific, expert-informed assessment
of risk, which takes into account the
factors that decrease and increase
transmission risk. Such an approach
avoids placing on the accused the
tactical burden of proof to introduce
case-specific evidence regarding HIV
transmission risk in response to the
general evidence of risk introduced
by the Crown. It properly places the
initial tactical decision on the Crown
whether to introduce medical and
scientific evidence of HIV transmission risk in the circumstances of the
case, readily obtained by the Crown
through search warrant, subpoena and
expert testimony.
Is aggravated (sexual) assault
the appropriate offence?
Currently, prosecutions for nondisclosure to one’s sexual partner
involve almost exclusively charges
of aggravated assault or aggravated
sexual assault.37 The latter is the
most serious sexual offence in the
Criminal Code and is punishable by
a maximum life sentence. These
offences are used whether or not HIV
is transmitted. In fact, prosecution
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will be easier where the virus is not
transmitted because where the complainant is HIV-positive the Crown
will need to prove that she was not
infected with HIV at the time of
sexual relations with the accused.38
We argue that both aggravated sexual
assault and aggravated assault result
in over-criminalization where the
virus is not transmitted to the complainant, and such serious offences
should be limited to cases where HIV
was transmitted with the result that
the complainant’s life was actually
endangered as opposed to the potential risk of endangerment.39
What makes an assault or sexual
assault “aggravated” is the additional
harm caused to the complainant
through wounding, maiming, disfiguring or endangering life.40 We
would argue that, where the virus
is not transmitted, life has not been
endangered. As mentioned earlier,
the presumption that sex with an
HIV-positive person is always lifeendangering is not accurate. Where
the virus is not transmitted, the fact
that it could have been is not sufficient to warrant the degree of
criminal responsibility attached to
an aggravated (sexual) assault conviction. New Zealand and several
Australian jurisdictions rely on different offences based on whether the
virus was transmitted.41
This raises the question of what
offence is most appropriate where
transmission has not taken place
despite the fact that the complainant
has been exposed to a significant risk
of acquiring HIV. We would argue
that, at most, the lesser included
offences of assault or sexual assault
be employed where the virus has not
been transmitted. This would be most
consistent with treating transmission
cases as aggravated (sexual) assault
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and the idea that non-disclosure, in
the context of a significant risk of
serious bodily harm, vitiates consent
to the touching involved. However,
assault-based offences leave courts in
the conundrum of applying probabilities in individual cases to determine
whether the risk of an event that did
not happen was significant.

Where the virus is not
transmitted, the fact that
it could have been is
not sufficient to warrant
the degree of criminal
responsibility attached
to an aggravated (sexual)
assault conviction.

We suggest that the Supreme
Court has a more radical option
open to it, that is, to reject the
assault-based analysis of Cuerrier
as unworkable and to shift the focus
to the harm caused by transmission.
The Court could re-think the question
of whether failure to disclose actually
vitiates consent to sexual activity.
What kind of deceptions constitute
fraud? On the one hand, one could
take a very broad approach such as
was done by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
in Cuerrier, whereby any deception
that induces consent constitutes fraud
and vitiates consent. Under such an
approach, if a man told a woman he
was single when in fact he was married and his assertion induced consent, his lie would constitute fraud

HIV
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vitiating consent. A broad approach
might be desirable in sexual assault
generally to protect women from
sexual violence and coercion.
On the other hand, one could
apply a narrower approach that only
limits consent in cases where the
fraud goes to precisely what the complainant consented to. For example,
in R v. Crangle,42 the accused was
the identical twin brother of the complainant’s boyfriend. When he started having sex with her, she thought
she was having sex with her boyfriend. This deception went to the
very essence of the sexual activity —
she consented to have sex with A and
not to have sex with B. The kind of
deception involved in non-disclosure
is subtly different from most of the
other fraud cases that arise. In the
HIV non-disclosure cases, the complainant wanted the sexual activity to
take place with the accused, but not
necessarily with a person who was
HIV-positive. The assumption is that
if the accused is HIV-positive, he or
she will disclose and sex will either
not take place or protective measures
will be taken.
We would argue, however, that
one can never presume one is having sex with a person who is HIVnegative. HIV is most transmissible
when one’s viral load is highest, such
as during the early stages of infection, often before the person knows
they are HIV-positive43 — and an
alarmingly high proportion of persons with HIV do not know their status.44 Nor can one make reasonable
assessments about who is likely to be
HIV-positive based on assumptions
about who gets HIV and who does
not. Thus, while the suggestion that
everyone needs to protect themselves
appears trite, it remains the best way
to prevent transmission of the virus.
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We do recognize that some people
are not in a position to insist on condom use or to understand the risks
involved in sexual activity generally.
In this latter category, it may be possible to argue that someone who does
not understand the risks involved
in sexual activity is not capable of
giving meaningful consent to sex.45
With respect to someone who cannot
safely insist on condom use to protect
herself, we question the voluntariness
of consent in this context.46
If the Court were to reject the
fraud-based approach as unworkable,
criminal negligence causing bodily
harm would be a possible charge
in cases of HIV transmission. The
mens rea is well-suited to the HIV
non-disclosure cases where, in the
vast majority of cases, the accused
does not intend to transmit the virus
and rather hopes that no transmission takes place.47 In such a case,
criminal negligence, which speaks of
wanton or reckless disregard for the
safety of others, seems well-suited
to the risk-taking nature of the activity. This offence would only apply
where the virus has been transmitted
because Canadian criminal law does
not punish criminal negligence in
and of itself without proof of bodily
harm or death. This offence would
take the focus off the sexual nature of
the harm and shift it to the deliberate
risk-taking activity on the part of the
accused. The more difficult question
is what offence might be appropriate where the virus is not transmitted. In our view, such cases should
only be prosecuted where there is a
pattern of non-disclosure in the context of unprotected sex. Common
nuisance is one option that could be
applied, an offence that criminalizes the endangering of “lives, safety
or health of the public” through an
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unlawful act or failure to discharge
a duty.48 This offence is not without
its problems and courts would still
have to draw limits about what level
of risk is sufficient to constitute that
endangerment to the public.49

It is imperative that
provincial and territorial
Attorneys General
seriously consider
developing comprehensive
prosecutorial guidelines.

We are not suggesting we can
resolve this difficult issue in a case
comment. Rather, we seek merely
to raise the possibility that the sexual assault approach is not the only
approach to this issue. What is clear
from examining various Criminal
Code provisions is that none of the
offences in the current Criminal Code
were designed to cover the nondisclosure of a sexually transmitted
infection. The Criminal Code used
to have a specific provision, enacted
in 1919,50 making it an offence,
punishable on summary conviction,
to communicate a venereal disease,
knowingly or by culpable negligence,
to another person. This provision
was, somewhat ironically, repealed in
1985, just a few years before the first
HIV non-disclosure prosecution in
Canada. In 1984, the federal Badgely
Committee had recommended,
instead of the provision, strengthening provincial health regulations,

non - disclosure

more effective diagnostic criteria,
research and public education.51 In
1985, the Fraser Committee concluded again that the provision was
“hopelessly outdated in the etiological assumptions it makes” and “clearly does not reflect modern knowledge
on, or practice in relation to, sexually transmitted diseases.”52 We are
concerned that HIV has been singled
out for special treatment when other
sexually transmitted infections may
be even more easily transmissible.
Why are HIV prosecutions increasing
in frequency and severity at the same
time that our ability to clinically
manage HIV, and to prevent transmission through antiretroviral medication, has improved so dramatically?
Whatever crime(s) the Supreme
Court of Canada decides should
apply in this context, it is imperative that provincial and territorial
Attorneys General seriously consider
developing comprehensive prosecutorial guidelines, as has been done
in England and Wales.53 Given the
dangers of over-criminalizing nondisclosure — such as discouraging
HIV testing, driving people living
with HIV away from health care and
social services out of fears of criminal prosecution — and the dangers of
further marginalizing people living
with HIV, guidelines should strive
to limit prosecutions to those cases
where the blunt force of the criminal
law is absolutely necessary to deter
or incapacitate the individual.
The need for caution in
the unique context of nondisclosure prosecutions
Our final point is that the political
and social dynamics of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions mitigate in
favour of caution. The Crown, in the
documents filed with the Supreme
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Court in Mabior and D.C., argues
that R v. Ewanchuk54 be used to
modify the rule in Cuerrier so as to
require fully informed consent, the
absence of which would render any
non-disclosures an aggravated sexual
assault.
The Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Ewanchuk was an important victory for women in the context
of sexual assault, reaffirming the
importance of consent being assessed
from the perspective of the complainant and the importance of autonomy
in sexual decision-making. We
are concerned that an expansion of
Ewanchuk in the HIV context ignores
the unique context of HIV non-disclosure prosecutions and the stigma
and prejudice resulting from overcriminalization of persons living with
HIV. The criminal law must be used
with particular caution where it is
being applied only against members
of a marginalized group and we must
ask whether other mechanisms, such
as public health legislation, are better
suited for dealing with this complex
social problem. We urge the courts
to deal with non-disclosure cases as a
unique context and not as an opportunity to expand the crime of sexual
assault generally.
As the Supreme Court of Canada
has recognized, sexual assault generally is a highly gendered crime.
Over 97 percent of those accused of
sexual assault are men,55 and roughly
85 percent of all complainants are
women.56 Certain groups of women
are at a higher risk of sexual assault,
such as women involved in prostitution,57 women with disabilities58 and
Aboriginal women.59 Conviction
rates for sexual assault generally are
also very low in part due to the fact
that women’s allegations of sexual
violence are often disbelieved.60
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The gendered nature of nondisclosure prosecutions is less clear
and something we are only beginning
to understand. Overwhelmingly,
in Canada,61 the accused in nondisclosure cases are men. A recent
study found that 91 percent of those
charged in Canada for failing to
disclose their HIV status are men.62
Overall, 65 percent of all Canadians
charged are men who fail to disclose
their status to women, although we
may be seeing an increase in the
number of charges against men who
have sex with men.63 However, this
does not appear to be an accurate
reflection of non-disclosure rates in
the community. There is some evidence that men withhold their HIV

The criminalization of nondisclosure may make nondisclosure more likely, as
persons with HIV may fear
the consequences of their
status becoming known
to previous or current
partners.

status more often than do women, but
this evidence is far from unambiguous and does not explain the preponderance of female complainants:
Variations in disclosure based on race,
gender and age yield controversial
findings. White and Hispanic individuals have been found to be more
likely to disclose to partners than

non - disclosure

African-Americans, yet other research
suggests that race and ethnicity do not
play a role. Although Stein and colleagues found that women are more
likely to disclose than men, most
existing research suggests that gender
is not associated with partner disclosure. Younger age has also been associated with higher disclosure. Other
researchers, however, have documented a relationship between youth and
non-disclosure.64

We would argue that the prosecutions
for non-disclosure in the HIV context
are disproportionately for non-disclosure in the heterosexual context.
This may say more about the value
we put on potential complainants
of non-disclosure than the potential
accused. Police and prosecutors may
be more likely to see women as victims of sexual assault (as compared
to gay men). Similarly, there may
be a different ethic in the gay community around laying complaints for
non-disclosure because of attitudes
towards police and the criminal justice system, or because there may
be a higher level of acceptance of
mutual responsibility for preventing
HIV transmission in the gay community. Conviction rates in the non-disclosure context are much higher than
in sexual assault generally,65 perhaps
because persons with HIV are even
less likely to be believed than sexual
assault complainants and guilty pleas
are common, possibly due to the publicity and resultant stigma associated
with these trials.
The impact of over criminalization of non-disclosure of HIV status
has implications for women both as
potential complainants and as potential accused.66 The cases to date
highlight women as HIV-negative
complainants who face the potential of acquiring the virus from their
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non-disclosing partners. But issues
of non-disclosure also arise for HIVpositive women. D.C. demonstrates
the complexity of this issue: charges
were not laid against D.C. until over
four years after the complainant
learned of the non-disclosure and only
after D.C. laid charges of domestic
assault. Women in relationships of
heightened inequality, such as women
in abusive relationships or women
with disabilities, may have particular barriers to disclosing their status
to sexual partners or in insisting on
condom use. There is also the alarming potential for charging women for
passing on the virus to their children
during childbirth or breastfeeding.67
Perhaps the biggest difference
between the non-disclosure context
and other sexual assault offences
is that every accused person in the
non-disclosure context is grappling
with HIV and thus is a member of a
highly stigmatized group in Canadian
society. The charges in question
relate directly to their status as HIVpositive individuals. They may have
acquired the virus through the nondisclosure of their partners or through
some other means. Regardless,
they are likely to have experienced
discrimination and rejection when
others have learned of their HIV
status. Many will have experienced
the loss of a job, the loss of friends
and the loss of a partner on disclosing their HIV-positive status.68
Over-criminalization of persons
with HIV runs the risk of further
marginalization and stigmatization.
Marginalization contributes to nondisclosure; it does not prevent it. The
more negative the social consequences of disclosure, the less likely it is
to take place. Until we give people
the necessary physical, economic
and social supports to enable them to
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disclose their status safely, non-disclosure is likely to continue at a high
rate. In fact, the criminalization of
non-disclosure may make non-disclosure more likely, as persons with HIV
may fear the consequences of their
status becoming known to previous
or current partners.

Conclusion
At a minimum, with the upcoming
appeals the Supreme Court should
address the need for clarity among
the range of people affected by the
criminal law related to HIV nondisclosure: people living with
HIV/AIDS, police, Crown counsel
and the judiciary. These people need
to know whether there is a duty to
disclose prior to oral sex, prior to
protected sexual intercourse, or prior
to unprotected sexual intercourse
where an HIV-positive person has an
undetectable viral load. The appeals
will also present the Supreme Court
with the opportunity to further refine
the criminalization of HIV nondisclosure in ways that will preserve
the integrity of sexual assault law by
restricting the circumstances in which
HIV non-disclosure calls for criminal prosecution and identifying the
Criminal Code offences most appropriate to those circumstances.
— Isabel Grant and Jonathan
Glenn Betteridge
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Law at the University of British Columbia;
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